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RULE 55 AT TRIAL:
THE DEFAULT RULE IS NOT ALWAYS BEST
INTRODUCTION
It is uncontroversial to say that a default, and corresponding default
judgment, is proper after a defendant fails to answer the complaint' or
if a party fails to comply with a discovery order.2 When a defendant
fails to appear at trial after previously answering the complaint or oth-
erwise filing defenses, however, the proper course of action for a court
to take is considerably less clear. Because many federal judges are
evaluated on their case disposition rates,3 the reflex reaction is to clear
a case off the docket at the first available opportunity. Even with
these concerns affecting the everyday workings of both litigators and
the federal judiciary, simply defaulting a party who fails to appear at
trial is commonly viewed as the most effective or efficient course of
action.
Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) states
that "[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is
sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is
shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's de-
fault."' 4 A question arises regarding how broadly to interpret the
phrase "otherwise defend," 5 and whether this phrase applies to trial as
opposed to only the earlier pleading stage of litigation. The federal
circuits have differed greatly in their interpretation of this simple two-
word phrase, from stating that the rule only applies at the pleading
stage,6 to stating that it applies anytime a party fails to take part in any
stage of the litigation.7 This Comment argues that courts should re-
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vi)..
If a party or a party's officer, director, or managing agent ... fails to obey an order to
provide or permit discovery ... the court where the action is pending may issue further
just orders. They may include the following: . . . (vi) rendering a default judgment
against the disobedient party ....
Id.
3. Patricia Lee Refo, The Vanishing Trial, A.B.A. J. SECTION LITIG., Winter 2004, at 1, 3.
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
5. Id.
6. See Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp. v. Bio-Energy Systems, Inc., 803 F.2d 1130, 1134 (11th
Cir. 1986); see also Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205, 210 (5th Cir. 1949) ("The words 'otherwise
defend' refer to attacks on the service, or motions to dismiss .... ").
7. See City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2011); see
also Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 917-18 (3d Cir. 1992); Home Port
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solve situations in which a defendant fails to appear at trial by holding
a trial on the merits in the defendant's absence, as opposed to default-
ing the defendant pursuant to Rule 55. Read plainly, Rule 55 cannot
be interpreted to extend beyond the pleading stage.
Part II of this Comment explains the historical background of the
FRCP, Rule 55 in particular, 8 and a trial judge's inherent power to
enter a default against a party.9 Part II also sets out pertinent federal
circuit decisions on the matter. 10 Part III analyzes the proper course
of action for a court when a defendant fails to appear for trial. Addi-
tionally, Part III analyzes whether a trial judge should use his inherent
power to default a defendant for failure to appear at trial, regardless
of the applicability of Rule 55.11 Part III further discusses whether
some circuits mistakenly entered a default pursuant to Rule 55 when
Rule 37 was the proper basis.12 Finally, Part III argues that the proper
course of action for a trial judge, when the defendant fails to appear at
trial after actively participating in the litigation up to that point, is to
hold a trial on the merits. 13 Part IV argues that limiting Rule 55 de-
faults to the pleading stage will lead to lower damage awards when a
defendant fails to appear at trial.14 Part IV further argues that if a
trial judge continues with a trial on the merits, instead of simply enter-
ing a default against a non-showing defendant, fewer judgments will
be overturned on appeal.15 Part V provides a brief conclusion on the
issue. 16
II. BACKGROUND
This Part provides the background of Rule 55, including: (1) the
history of the FRCP;17 (2) the basis for a trial judge's inherent power
to enter a default judgment;18 and (3) major federal circuit decisions
Rentals, Inc. v. Ruben, 957 F.2d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 1992); Ringgold Corp. v. Worrall, 880 F.2d
1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1989); Brock v. Unique Racquetball & Health Clubs, Inc., 786 F.2d 61, 64
(2d Cir. 1986).
8. See infra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 40-106 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 107-24 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 125-42 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 143-81 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 192-210 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
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regarding the proper use of Rule 55,19 including the most recent ap-
proach the federal circuits have taken. 20
A. The History of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 55
In 1934, after years of discussion by the American Bar Association,
Congress empowered the Supreme Court to promulgate a system of
uniform rules for actions at law. 21 Accordingly, the Supreme Court
appointed an Advisory Committee, comprised mostly of practicing
lawyers, charged with drafting rules of procedure for the district
courts.2 2 "The Committee started its work with a study of existing
procedure in the federal courts, in the various states, [and] in England
....23 The Committee did not shy away from adopting state prac-
tices and English procedural tools, and even created completely new
procedural rules without any precedent. 24 The purpose of the FRCP
was both "a shift of emphasis from rigid adherence to a prescribed
procedure to a distinct effort to bring about the disposition of every
case on the merits," 25 and a shift in the adversarial system to enhance
the duty between the parties to ascertain truth and attain justice.26
Rule 55 represents the Committee's combination of the equity de-
cree pro confesso and the judgment by default at law.27 The Commit-
tee adopted Rule 55 from a Massachusetts Rule of General Practice,28
and developed a rule that allowed the courts leeway in its applica-
tion.29 Most importantly for this Comment, section (a) of Rule 55 has
led to significant differences of interpretation and application.
B. The Court's Inherent Power to Enter Default
Separate from the FRCP, trial courts possess the inherent power to
dismiss an action with prejudice 30 or enter a judgment by default.31
19. See infra notes 39-90 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 91-106 and accompanying text.
21. See Alexander Holtzoff, Origin and Sources of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1057, 1057-58 (1955); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
22. Holtzoff, supra note 21, at 1058.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 1058-59.
25. Id. at 1059.
26. Id. at 1060.
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 55 committee's note. For purposes of this Comment, the terms "default
judgment" and "judgment by default" will be used interchangeably.
28. Id. (explaining that subsection (a) comes from the Massachusetts practice, 2 Mass. Gen.
Laws (1932) ch. 231, § 57).
29. See FED. R. Civ. P. 55.
30. See, e.g., Indep. Prods. Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir. 1960).
31. See, e.g., Shepherd v. ABC, 62 F.3d 1469, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
2012]
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An example of this power is when a judge dismisses an action due to
an attorney's dilatoriness. 32 There is no hard and fast rule limiting a
trial judge's inherent powers,33 but "the dismissal of an action with
prejudice or the entry of a default judgment are drastic remedies, and
should be applied only in extreme circumstances. '34 Also, when a
federal rule governs a particular procedure, a trial court's use of its
inherent powers is improper. 35 Such a use of inherent power can only
obscure the analysis of the court's determination.36
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit previously
employed a factor test to review situations in which a district court
entered a default as a sanction through its inherent power.37 The
court stated that the trial judge must consider and balance the follow-
ing factors before making a determination:
(1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice
to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and
respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the
conduct of the party of the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5)
the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an
analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the
claim or defense.38
Though this test is binding on only the Third Circuit, it is extensive in
its inclusion of relevant factors and concerns that should be important
to any trial judge considering the use of his inherent power to enter a
default.39
32. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962) (stating that the district court's
dismissal of the suit after the plaintiff's attorney failed to appear at a pretrial conference was not
an abuse of discretion, although the court refused to acknowledge whether only one failure to
appear, without more, would justify such a dismissal).
33. See Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985) ("The notion of inher-
ent power has been described as nebulous, and its bounds as 'shadowy."' (citation omitted)).
34. indep. Prods. Corp., 283 F.2d at 733 (citing Gill v. Stolow, 240 F.2d 669, 670 (2d Cir.
1957)); see also Producers Releasing Corp. De Cuba v. PRC Pictures, Inc., 176 F.2d 93, 96 (2d
Cir. 1949).
35. See Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales v. Rogers,
357 U.S. 197, 207 (1958) (holding that the court's inherent power was an inappropriate justifica-
tion for a dismissal because of noncompliance with a production order when Rule 37 was
available).
36. Id.
37. See Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).
38. Id. A trial court's decision to sanction a party with a default judgment is reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 1148 (3d Cir.
1990).
39. See, e.g., Shepherd v. ABC, 62 F.3d 1469, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that a court may
use its inherent power only if it finds first that abusive behavior occurred and second "that a
lesser sanction would not sufficiently punish and deter the abusive conduct while allowing a full
and fair trial on the merits"); Estate of Solis-Rivera v. United States, 993 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir.
1993) ("[Dismissal with prejudice is proper if] there is extremely protracted inaction, disobedi-
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C. The Current Split in the Federal Circuit Courts
Since 1949, numerous federal circuits have interpreted the meaning
of "otherwise defend" in Rule 55. The trend has moved from limiting
Rule 55 to pretrial conduct to including any failures a court deems
strong enough to merit default, regardless of the stage of litigation at
which they occur.
1. The Fifth Circuit Interprets "Otherwise Defend"
In 1949, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
first determined the meaning of the phrase "otherwise defend" in
Rule 55(a). In Bass v. Hoagland, the plaintiff sued the defendant for
$7,810.70 in damages for a personal injury stemming from a car acci-
dent.40 After receiving the complaint, counsel for the defendant filed
an appearance, as well as an answer to the complaint and a demand
for jury trial.41 The defendant's counsel then withdrew from the suit,
but did not withdraw the previously filed appearance or answer. 42 On
the day of trial, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant appeared, and
the only individuals in court were the plaintiff's attorneys. 43 Because
of the defendant's absence and previous withdrawal of counsel, the
trial judge considered the case to be in default and entered judgment
for the exact amount sued for in the complaint. 44 The defendant ap-
pealed to the Fifth Circuit to set aside the judgment under Rules 55(c)
and 60(b). 45
The Fifth Circuit held that the default judgment was improper be-
cause Rule 55 did not extend to matters of trial.46 The court reasoned
that Rule 55 "does not require that to escape default the defendant
must not only file a sufficient answer to the merits, but must also have
a lawyer or be present in court when the case is called for a trial." '47
The court went on to define the words "otherwise defend," stating,
that they "refer to attacks on the service or motions to dismiss, or for
ence of court orders, ignorance of warnings, contumacious conduct, or some other aggravating
circumstance such as prejudice to the defendant, glaring weaknesses in the plaintiff's case, and
the wasteful expenditure of a significant amount of the district court's time." (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
40. Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205, 207 (5th Cir. 1949).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 207-08.
43. Id. at 207.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 208; see also FED. R. Crv. P. 55(c) ("The court may set aside an entry of default for
good cause, and it may set aside a default judgment under Rule 60(b).").
46. See Bass, 172 F.2d at 210.
47. Id.
2012]
DEPA UL LAW REVIEW
better particulars, and the like, which may prevent default without
presently pleading on the merits."'48
2. The Eleventh Circuit Follows the Fifth Circuit
In Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp. v. Bio-Energy Systems, Inc., the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled on the meaning of
"otherwise defend. '49 The parties to the suit originally agreed to set-
tle the claim.50 Because of the settlement, the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida dismissed the suit with prejudice, but re-
tained jurisdiction over the matter to enforce the settlement agree-
ment.5 1 Three years after the agreement was reached, the plaintiff
filed a motion to reinstate the action and alleged that the defendant
was in violation of the settlement agreement.5 2 The defendant's local
counsel in Florida received service on the motion three days after the
filing and promptly forwarded the motion to the defendant's perma-
nent counsel in New York. 53 The defendant's local counsel in Florida
spoke with the plaintiff's counsel and promised to send a joint motion
for extension of time.54 The plaintiff's motion to reinstate the action
was never responded to, however, and no communication between the
parties occurred after this point.5 The trial court eventually granted
the plaintiff's motion without opposition and entered the attached or-
der.56 One week later, the defendant moved to vacate the judgment
under Rule 60(b). 57 The trial court denied the motion.5 8
48. Id.
49. Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp. v. Bio-Energy Syst., Inc., 803 F.2d 1130 (11th Cir. 1986).
50. Id. at 1131.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp., 803 F.2d at 1131.
56. Id.
57. Id. Rule 60(b) of the FRCP states:
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from
a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or mis-
conduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier
judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer
equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
[Vol. 62:159
RULE 55 AT TRIAL
The Eleventh Circuit held that the reinstatement order was not a
proper Rule 55 default judgment.59 The court reasoned that its au-
thority to enter a default under Rule 55 is limited to situations in
which a defendant never appears or fails to answer a complaint, be-
cause such failures prevent the case from being judged on its merits.60
The court explained that although the defendant failed to appear at
trial, a default was improper when the defendant answered the com-
plaint because the "issue [had] been joined. '61 Thus, the court could
proceed with the trial in the defendant's absence and enter judgment
in favor of a plaintiff that is able to prove his case. 62
3. The Ninth Circuit Holds that Defaulting at Trial is Proper
In 1989, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit provided its
answer to the question of a Rule 55 default at the trial stage. In Ring-
gold Corp. v. Worrall, the plaintiff sued for breach of a franchising
license. 63 On two separate occasions, the plaintiff's attorneys with-
drew from representation, citing numerous difficulties with their cli-
ent, including failure to pay legal fees, uncooperativeness, and refusal
or failure to respond to discovery requests. 64 The hearing on the final
request for withdrawal of representation occurred without the plain-
tiff present, though a notice of the trial dates was mailed to the plain-
tiff's Houston address.65 The plaintiff failed to respond in any
manner. 66 Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to retain new counsel and
was absent from multiple pretrial conferences.67 At this time, the dis-
58. Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp., 803 F.2d at 1131. The trial court made its determination
after Bio-Energy filed its motion to vacate, attached affidavits pursuant to Rule 60(b), and re-
quested oral argument. Id. The trial court received briefs from both parties, but did not respond
to the request for oral argument before it denied Bio-Energy's motion. Id.
59. Id. at 1134.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Ringgold Corp. v. Worrall, 880 F.2d 1138, 1139 (9th Cir. 1989).
64. Id. On both occasions, the attorneys claimed that they had not been adequately paid, and
the Ninth Circuit noted from the trial court's record that "[tihere had been a 'breakdown of
communications between [the attorney] and Ringgold' which 'severely and detrimentally' af-
fected the ability of [the attorney] to represent Ringgold." Id. at 1139-40.
65. Id. at 1140.
66. Id. The hearing resulted in an order from the court, granting the attorney's request for
withdrawal. Id. The order also stated the following: (1) that no continuances would be granted
in the future; (2) that Ringgold Corporation would need to appear with local counsel for the next
court date: (3) that the attorney was required to notify the Worralls of the last-known contact
information for Ringgold Corporation in order to allow the Worralls to serve Ringgold Corpora-
tion with pleading or papers in the future; and (4) that default was a possible sanction if Ring-
gold Corporation did not follow the order. Id.
67. Id.
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trict court directed the defendants to file a motion for default with a
hearing set for the original trial date.68 The plaintiff also failed to ap-
pear for the default judgment hearing, and the court took evidence on
the issue of damages for defendants, eventually finding for them in an
amount over $800,000.69 The plaintiff responded three weeks later
with a motion to set aside the default judgment for inadequate notice
of the hearing date.70 The district court denied the motion and the
plaintiff appealed.7'
The Ninth Circuit held that though this was "not a typical default
judgment, where a party show[ed] no interest in defending a claim," it
was a proper Rule 55 default all the same.72 The court analogized its
decision to a prior Second Circuit decision that deferred to the judg-
ment of the trial judge in matters of maintaining "'the orderly and
expeditious conduct of the litigation"' and opined that judges must be
given significant latitude to impose sanctions upon parties that fail to
attend after a trial has begun.73
4. The Third Circuit Follows the Ninth Circuit
In 1992, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
interpreted Rule 55 in Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co.74 In
Hoxworth, three separate class action suits were filed on behalf of in-
vestors, claiming fraud "in connection with the purchase and sale of
various penny stocks. ' 75 The case had originally come before the
Third Circuit on an appeal of a preliminary injunction that was
68. Id.
69. Ringgold Corp., 880 F.2d at 1140. This amount was the total of the requested damages
and the Worralls' attorney's fees. Id. In addition to granting a judgment for the Worralls, the
trial court also dismissed Ringgold Corporation's complaint against the Worralls. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1140. The district court construed Ringgold Corporation's motion to set aside the
default judgment as a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration. Rule 59(e) simply states, "A mo-
tion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed not later than 28 days after the entry of judg-
ment." FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
72. Ringgold Corp., 880 F.2d at 1141.
73. Id. (quoting Brock v. Unique Racquetball & Health Clubs, Inc., 786 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir.
1986)). In Brock, the Secretary of Labor sued the defendant, on behalf of the defendant's em-
ployees, for failure to pay the employees minimum wage or overtime. See Brock v. Unique
Racquetball & Health Clubs, Inc., 786 F.2d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1986). The trial court entered a
default when neither the defendant nor its attorney appeared for the second day of trial. Id. at
62-64. The court further stated that had the trial been proceeding on consecutive days and
defendant had not appeared, there would be "no question" that the court could enter a default,
and the delay between proceedings did not change that fact. Id. at 64.
74. Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1992).
75. Id. at 914. "Penny stocks are low-priced, high-risk equity securities for which there is
frequently no well-developed trading market." Id. at 914 n.l.
166 [Vol. 62:159
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deemed "fatally overbroad," and therefore vacated and remanded. 76
Following the remand, the suit only continued against three named
individuals who were control persons of the firm.77 The classes of in-
vestors then filed an amended complaint that added one defendant
and removed any claims for relief against the investment company.78
The new defendants, the executives of the investment company, an-
swered this complaint by denying all allegations and raising numerous
affirmative defenses. 79
After a year, in an attempt to move the case to trial, the trial judge
entered a scheduling order that included a discovery deadline. 80 Over
one month later, the attorney for the executives moved to withdraw
from the case due to a fee dispute.81 The court granted counsel's re-
quest for withdrawal but did not grant the executives' request to stay
action on all pending matters.8 2 Over the ensuing months, the execu-
tives were uncooperative in the discovery process and failed to desig-
nate an officer for depositions or produce subpoenaed documents. 83
When the executives finally appointed an officer to testify in response
to a subpoena, the individual stated that he had absolutely no knowl-
edge of the situation.84 Later, none of the three defendants complied
with a court order to file a pretrial memorandum or other orders re-
garding production of documents.8 5 The classes of investors then
moved for default judgment pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(C). 86 The trial
judge entered the default, held a hearing to determine damages, and
eventually granted over $73 million to the plaintiffs.87
76. Id. at 915 (quoting Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 201 (3d Cir.
1990)).
77. Id. After the remand, a new suit had been filed against the corporation by the Securities
Investors Protection Corporation (SIPC) under the Securities Investors Protection Act of 1970
(15 U.S.C. § 78aaa (2006)).
78. See id.
79. Id. at 915.
80. Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 915. The order also gave a date by which the parties were required
to file a pretrial memorandum. Id.
81. Id. at 915-16. The defendants did not object to the withdrawal of their counsel, provided
that the court would stay action for sixty days to allow them to obtain new counsel. Id. at 916.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 916. The individual that was appointed claimed that the only person with the com-
pany that would have knowledge pertaining to the events that were to be covered by the deposi-
tion had been fired from the company four days prior. Id. Hoxworth's counsel then suggested
that Blinder would have knowledge of the requisite information and he should go through with
the deposition. Id. Blinder refused to be deposed citing his rights under the Fifth Amendment.
Id.
85. Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 916.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 917.
2012]
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On appeal, the Third Circuit noted that the trial court had explicitly
referenced Rule 55 as authority for its action.88 The court held that
the default was proper, 9 reasoning that, on its face, the language
"otherwise defend" was much broader than a mere failure to plead.
Further, through analogy to precedent, both within and outside its ju-
risdiction, the court held that a failure to appear at trial justified de-
fault as a proper sanction. 90
5. The Second Circuit Continues with the Current Trend
In May 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit became the most recent federal circuit to interpret "otherwise
defend." 91 In City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, the City
of New York sued fifteen federally licensed firearms dealers operating
out of Georgia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia.92
Of the two stores that were the subject of the appeal, neither received
revenue from sales within the State of New York and both required
individuals to be physically present at their stores to complete gun
purchases.93 The city brought suit against the gun dealers alleging that
they engaged in unlawful sales practices that contributed to a public
nuisance within the city because they engaged in "strawman
purchases. ' 94 Mickalis Pawn Shop (Mickalis), Adventure Outdoors,
and other defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion, arguing that New York's long-arm statute was not satisfied.95
The trial court denied the motions to dismiss.96
Roughly two months later, Mickalis's owner was indicted on federal
gun charges and Mickalis's counsel moved to withdraw from the civil
suit, citing the owner's intentions to concentrate on his criminal de-
fense. 97 The district judge held a status conference on the motions to
withdraw, at which time Mickalis's counsel stated that Mickalis under-
88. Id.
89. Id. at 919. The court stated that the district court permissibly relied on Rule 55 to enter a
default against the defendants, but noted that it may not have been the only basis for the default.
Id.
90. Id. at 917-19.
91. See City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2011).
92. Id. at 118.
93. Id. at 119.
94. Id. at 120. In a "straw" purchase, an individual purchases a firearm intending to transfer it
to another individual who is not legally allowed to purchase the gun. Id. at 120 n.4. The true
buyer is not able to complete the required form, ATF Form 4473, so the stand-in buyer com-
pletes the form and submits to the federally required background check. Id.
95. Id. at 120.
96. Id. at 121.
97. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 121-22.
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stood default to be a possible consequence of this decision, but did not
expressly consent to the entry of default.98 The judge granted the
withdrawal of counsel and granted the city's request for a default to
be entered.99
Adventure Outdoors, the other defendant in the suit, completed the
discovery stage, even going so far as to reach jury selection, before its
counsel moved to withdraw from the representation, citing Adventure
Outdoor's choice "not to engage in the futile exercise of defending
itself at a bench trial." 100 The district judge denied counsel's motion
to withdraw because the trial was already underway, and cautioned
Adventure Outdoors that if it failed to go forward with the case, that
action would "constitute a default" under FRCP 55.101 Adventure
Outdoors still refused to proceed with the trial, and the district judge
noted Adventure Outdoors's default on the record and conditionally
granted the city's motion for default judgment. 10 2
The Second Circuit affirmed the default judgments against both de-
fendants. 10 3 The court stated that it embraced a broad understanding
of the phrase "otherwise defend" and reasoned that "'a trial judge,
responsible for the orderly and expeditious conduct of litigation, must
have broad latitude to impose the sanction of default for non-attend-
ance occurring after a trial has begun. ' '1 0 4 Each defendant affirma-
tively expressed its intention to stop defending the suit, failed to retain
a substitute for its withdrawn counsel, and made clear that it was
aware that its conduct could result in a default.10 5 Therefore, the trial
judge's entry of default was proper. 10 6
III. ANALYSIS
Once a dispute reaches the trial stage, it is rarely proper for a trial
judge to enter a default judgment against one of the parties. This Part
discusses what the proper course of action is in a scenario in which
one party fails to appear at trial after having participated in the law-
suit up to that point. Though trial judges have the inherent ability to
98. Id. at 122.
99. Id. at 123. Pursuant to the entry of default, the district court also entered a permanent
injunction against Mickalis. Id.
100. Id. at 123-24.
101. Id. at 124.
102. Id.
103. Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 130.
104. Id. at 129 (quoting Brock v. Unique Racquetball & Health Clubs, Inc., 786 F.2d 61, 64
(2d Cir. 1986)).
105. Id. at 130.
106. Id.
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enter a default regardless of the FRCP, using this power at the trial
stage is most likely a mistake, and simply holding a trial on the merits
in the defendant's absence is a better vehicle through which to prop-
erly effectuate justice. Furthermore, the basis for the growing senti-
ment that a default is proper at trial may come from misinterpreting
the precedent of cases in which a default judgment was properly en-
tered under Rule 37. Thus, when a defendant fails to appear at trial
after having been an active participant in the suit up to that point, the
court should hold a trial on the merits in the defendant's absence.
A. A Trial Judge Should Not Use His Inherent Power to Default
Defendants that Fail to Appear at Trial
Historically, trial judges have been given wide latitude to sanction
parties for "bad-faith conduct. 10 7 Though there is some sentiment
that this power should not be used in ways that subvert either the
FRCP or other governing statutes, 10 8 the trial judge can use it to fill
gaps that have been left open by the legislature. 10 9
After applying the Third Circuit's test for use of inherent power to a
situation in which a defendant fails to appear at trial, after having
been diligent in all pretrial work, it seems clear that a default is im-
proper. 110 Factors (1), (4), and (6) of the test are extremely fact-spe-
cific-they would entail an in-depth examination into individual cases
and, therefore, are not applicable to this hypothetical look at whether
use of a trial court's inherent power is proper in general."' Factors
(2), (3), and (5), however, provide some insight into the proper analy-
sis in which a court should engage. 112
The second factor, "the prejudice to the adversary caused by the
failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery,11 3 weighs
107. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991).
108. See id. at 61 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); cf Societe Internationale Pour Participations In-
dustrielles Et Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207 (1958).
109. Chambers, 501 U.S. 32 at 46 ("We discern no basis for holding that the sanctioning
scheme of the statute and the rules displaces the inherent power to impose sanctions .... At the
very least, the inherent power must continue to exist to fill in the interstices.").
110. To reiterate, the factors of the Third Circuit's test are as follows:
(1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary
caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history
of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party of the attorney was willful or in
bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analy-
sis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.
Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. Id.
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heavily against entry of a default. If a defendant fails to appear at a
properly scheduled trial, the plaintiff could not have been prejudiced
by failures with regard to scheduling orders or discovery because dis-
covery is a necessary prerequisite to trial. In fact, any violations of the
court's orders or failures in discovery can be cured at the time they
occur without resorting to the court's inherent power.'1 4 The fact that
a defendant has managed to reach the trial without the invocation of
the judge's inherent power surely weighs against default.
The third factor, "a history of dilatoriness,"'1 1 5 also disfavors the en-
try of default once the litigation has reached the trial stage for reasons
similar to the second factor. If the defendant has been diligent until
his failure to appear at trial, then the missed court date is most likely
the first instance of dilatory behavior. The Third Circuit, in applying
this test, stated that "a history of dilatoriness" implied more than one
failure to comply in a timely manner." 6 The court stated that the
plaintiff's counsel had caused delay numerous times, and violated nu-
merous time limits imposed by both the rules of civil procedure and
the court.'1 7 This extensive record of delay should not be equated to a
single missed appearance, even at a date as late as trial. As previously
mentioned, if the party has missed previous dates for conferences, dis-
covery orders, and other court mandated actions, the court may avail
itself of tools other than its inherent power. 1 8
The fifth factor of the test to determine whether default pursuant to
a court's inherent power is proper-"the effectiveness of sanctions
other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanc-
tions"119-also disfavors the entry of default. Even if a trial judge
were to disagree with the analysis and determine that use of his inher-
ent power was proper, one failure to appear at the trial stage does not
seem to reach the high level of impropriety that warrants a default.
The Third Circuit explicitly mentioned two possible alternatives to a
default: levying fines or imposing attorney's fees on the violating
party.120 In any situation in which a party causes undue delay or oth-
erwise improperly causes its adversary to incur excess costs, simply
114. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
115. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868.
116. See id. (citing Donnelly v. Jones-Manville Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1982)).
117. Id.
118. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
119. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868. Though some federal circuits have failed to find alternative sanc-
tions to be a significant factor, recent academic discussion on the topic has argued that the effec-
tiveness of alternative sanctions is an essential element to any analysis of whether a default is
proper, through inherent power or otherwise. See, e.g., Arthur J. Park, Fixing Faults in the Cur-
rent Default Judgment Framework, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 155, 164 (2011).
120. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869.
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sending the bill to the offending party is both a proper deterrent for
future misconduct and a punishment that is directly proportional to
the harm caused. Surely, this sanction is enough to attain the desired
effect that the default would accomplish. In any event, either of these
alternatives is preferable to a default, which "must be a sanction of
last, not first, resort. ' 121
As shown above, a failure to appear at trial does not seem to merit
a default pursuant to a trial court's inherent power. Though some of
the factors are extremely fact-specific and, as such, are not analyzed in
this Comment, it seems clear that an overall balancing would weigh
against default. The plaintiff is not overly prejudiced by the defen-
dant's actions, 122 the requisite reoccurrence of dilatory acts is likely
lacking,123 and lesser sanctions would properly punish the defendant,
thereby reducing the need for default. 124
B. Courts Have Openly Ignored Default Under Rule 37
in Favor of Default Under Rule 55
Rule 55 is not the exclusive vehicle within the FRCP that allows the
imposition of default. Rule 37 allows the trial to court to "render[ ] a
default judgment against [the] disobedient party"'2 5 who "fails to
obey an order to provide or permit discovery. 1' 26 The court orders
governed by this rule include, but are not limited to, orders for: (1)
conferences between the parties;127 (2) physical and mental examina-
tions;1 28 and (3) disclosure or discovery.12 9 In fact, Rule 37 governs
failures regarding all pretrial discovery rules, the importance of which
cannot be overstated. 130 Prior to the creation of the rules, and under
English common law, pretrial civil procedure consisted solely of
pleading.' 3 ' There were no means of testing any of the allegations or
defenses contained within the complaint and answer until the matter
121. Id.
122. See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 115-118 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vi). The entry of default is only one of seven permitted
sanctions at the court's disposal under this rule.
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
127. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a).
129. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
130. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495. 500 (1947) ("The pretrial deposition-discovery
mechanism established by Rules 26 to 37 is one of the most significant innovations of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.").
131. Edson R. Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure, 36 MICH. L. REV.
215, 216 (1937).
[Vol. 62:159
RULE 55 AT TRIAL
came to trial. 132 Federal civil trials now have adequate discovery pro-
cedures in place to support an efficient litigation schedule by permit-
ting all "parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues
and facts before trial. 133
In Ackra Direct Marketing Corp. v. Fingerhut Corp., a magistrate
judge ordered discovery to be closed and for any outstanding discov-
ery materials to be completed by a set future date.' 34 The defendants
never produced any outstanding discovery responses, ignored final
pretrial and settlement conference requirements, and failed to attend
the final pretrial conference. 135 The plaintiffs filed for a default judg-
ment against the defendants, which the magistrate judge granted in its
entirety. 136 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit treated the default as falling
under Rule 55(b)(2), while explicitly rejecting the contention that the
default judgment was a sanction under Rule 37, because the default
was ordered in response to the defendants' "failure to defend."'
1 37
Unfortunately, such a rejection of a Rule 37 default in favor of a
Rule 55 default is a relatively common occurrence.' 38 Judges seem
reluctant to grant case-dispositive sanctions against parties who fail to
comply with discovery rules, while simultaneously deeming that action
sufficient to merit a failure to "otherwise defend."' 139 This reluctance
seems counterintuitive, especially when viewed from the position of
the opposing party. The plaintiff has been diligently gathering docu-
ments, attending depositions, and appearing in court for conferences,
while his adversary has created difficulties for the plaintiff at every
turn. The FRCP specifically enable a trial judge to order a default as a
sanction against such misconduct.140 To ignore the express provision
of Rule 37 in order to grant the same remedy under a more broadly
interpreted rule, such as Rule 55(a), is unnecessary.
132. See id. ("The great weakness of pleading as a means for developing and presenting issues
of fact for trial lay in its total lack of any means for testing the factual basis for the pleader's
allegations and denials.").
133. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501.
134. Ackra Direct Mktg. Corp. v. Fingerhut Corp., 86 F.3d 852, 855 (8th Cir. 1996).
135. Id. "From July 1992 to April 1994 .... [defendants] delayed the discovery process by
submitting late and non-responsive discovery answers and by failing to produce some discovery
altogether." Id. at 854.
136. Id. at 855.
137. See id. at 855-56.
138. See, e.g., Home Port Rentals, Inc. v. Ruben, 957 F.2d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 1992) (relying
upon an apparent "failure... to participate in prosecution or defense" of the action to warrant a
default despite the trial court's mention of failure to participate in discovery); Hoxworth v.
Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 916-17 (3d Cir. 1992) (entering default pursuant to Rule
55 despite the plaintiffs' explicit reliance upon Rule 37 in its request for a default judgment).
139. FED. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
140. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vi).
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Though the outcome and the standard of review are the same under
both Rule 55 and Rule 37, the underlying review on appeal will differ
between a default granted for discovery abuses and a default granted
for other reasons.14 1 Courts look much less favorably upon discovery
abuses than other abuses, as well they should. 42 When a defendant
deserves to be defaulted, there is no reason to attribute the default to
a basis that may be more easily overturned by a reviewing court, espe-
cially when that basis has caused a split between the circuits over its
proper usage.
C. Conducting a Trial on the Merits is the Proper Course of Action
Although judges are "responsible for the orderly and expeditious
conduct of litigation, [and] must have broad latitude to impose the
sanction of default for non-attendance, 143 trial courts have a greater
duty to give due regard and adequate opportunity for both parties to
be heard in all instances. 144 These competing interests have caused
dissension between the federal circuit courts.
From the standpoint of statutory interpretation, it seems clear that
Rule 55 applies only to the pleadings stage of litigation; once a plead-
ing or other affirmative motion has been filed, the opposing party can
no longer avail itself of this procedural tool. 145 Though there is room
141. See Ackra Direct Mktg. Corp., 86 F.3d at 856 n.4. For an additional discussion of alterna-
tive rules within the FRCP that may better serve as the basis for a default judgment, see Josiah
A. Contarino, Note, Playing By the Rules: FRCP 55(A) and the Circuit Split Regarding Its Mean-
ing, 25 REGENT U. L. REv. 209, 234-35 (2012-2013).
142. See Everyday Learning Corp. v. Larson, 242 F.3d 815, 817-18 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding
that in cases in which a defendant exhibits actions designed to delay and evade discovery pro-
ceedings, a trial judge does not need to investigate the propriety of a less extreme sanction); see
also Avionic Co. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 957 F.2d 555, 558 (8th Cir. 1992) ("[W]hen the facts
show willfulness to bad faith [in delaying discovery], the selection of a proper sanction, including
dismissal, is entrusted to the sound discretion of the court.").
143. Brock v. Unique Racquetball & Health Clubs, Inc., 786 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1986).
144. As explained in Bass v. Hoagland:
The fundamental conception of a court of justice is condemnation only after hearing.
To say that courts have an inherent power to deny all right to defend an action and to
render decrees without any hearing whatever is in the very nature of things to convert
the court exercising such authority into an instrument of wrong and oppression, and
hence to strip it of that attribute of justice upon which the exercise of judicial power
necessarily depends.
Bass v. Hogland, 172 F.2d 205, 210 (5th Cir. 1949) (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. FED. R. Civ. P. 55(a); see also Bass, 172 F.2d at 210 ("[Rule 55] does not require that to
escape default the defendant ... must also have a lawyer or be present in court when the case is
called for trial. The words 'otherwise defend' refer to attacks on the service, or motions to
dismiss, or for better particulars, and the like, which may prevent default without presently
pleading to the merits."); cf. Smith v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 926 F.2d 1470, 1478 (6th Cir.
1991) (stating that the language "otherwise defend" refers only to defenses and objections avail-
able to a defendant prior to filing an answer).
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for some interpretation of the meaning of the rule, as evidenced by
the current federal circuit split, it can be argued that the correct inter-
pretation of "otherwise defend" is much narrower than the circuit
courts have adopted in recent years.146 In any event, the Supreme
Court has long held that when a statute is clear, as Rule 55 appears to
be, courts should follow the plain language of the statute.
147
As stated above, the trial court's main duty is to give an adequate
chance for a hearing whenever possible, and to bring a judgment to
every case on the merits without worrying about procedural law.
148
Continuing with the litigation and allowing a trial on the merits in a
defendant's absence meets both of these goals. 149 Unless the party's
prior conduct warrants such an action, there appears to be no justifica-
tion to default a party that fails to appear at trial. 150 Assuming discov-
ery has been completed, there should be sufficient evidence to permit
the plaintiff to both support his case and provide the judge with an
adequate record to render a decision. In this sense, Hoxworth, in
which the court stated that there was no difference between the effect
of delay at the pleading stage and the effect of delay at trial, is almost
certainly wrong.' 51 It seems unreasonable to think that a failure to
appear at trial poses the same impediment to the orderly progress of a
case as the failure to plead. When a trial date has been set, presuma-
bly, all of the necessary legwork is complete. Plaintiffs completed
their discovery and formulated their theory of the case. In contrast, if
146. See D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 107 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating in dicta that
Rule 55 is only meant to apply to a civil suit in which only a complaint has been filed thereby not
giving the court any evidence with which to proceed); see also 10A CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 2682 (3d ed. 1998) ("[T]he Bass conclusion seems
preferable. A defendant who has participated throughout the pretrial process and has filed a
responsive pleading, placing the case at issue, has not conceded liability."). But see Seven Elves,
Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 400 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that Bass has been criticized on
multiple grounds).
147. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("Where the language [of a
statute] is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not
arise .... ).
148. See Holtzoff, supra note 21, at 1058 (giving one of the underlying philosophies behind the
creation of the new FRCP, and thus one of the underlying philosophies the drafters expected of
the trial courts).
149. See Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp. v. Bio-Energy Systems, Inc., 803 F.2d 1130, 1134
(11th Cir. 1986) (stating that a court can proceed with trial in defendant's absence and allow a
judgment in favor of plaintiff if he adequately proves his case); see also Bass, 172 F.2d 205 at 210
(stating that when the defendant failed to show at trial, the plaintiff could proceed, but would
have to prove his case on the merits).
150. Such behavior could consist of a failure to comply with an order to permit or provide
discovery under Rules 26(f), 35, or 37(a), or failing to previously plead or otherwise defend as
required by Rule 55(a).
151. Contra Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 918 (3d Cir. 1992).
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a defendant fails to even answer a complaint, the plaintiff has nothing
with which to develop a record upon which it can argue for judg-
ment.152 A default against a party that delays its adversary from com-
pleting its half of the litigation is more proper than a default against a
party that merely waives its right to proffer a defense at trial.153
The simplest way to illustrate the effective differences between the
two types of Rule 55 defaults is through a hypothetical. In the first
case, a plaintiff properly files a complaint and serves notice to the op-
posing party pursuant to the FRCP.154 The attentive defendant re-
tains counsel and responds to the complaint. 155 At this point, both
parties will likely appear in court on a hearing associated with the
filing of the complaint.' 56 The trial judge has the opportunity to
schedule future status conferences and hearings.157 After a hearing,
and before trial, both parties engage in discovery to ascertain any and
all information pertinent to their case. This may involve depositions
of witnesses,158 interrogatories,15 9 production of documents, 60 re-
quests for admission, 161 and more as provided by the FRCP. In this
scenario, every aspect of the litigation has occurred without error up
to this point. After all pretrial discovery has been completed and a
date has been set for trial, however, the defendant stops actively liti-
gating and fails to appear in court on the date of trial. Accordingly,
upon the judge's order, or motion by the plaintiff, a default is entered
against the defendant.162
The second hypothetical scenario is more straightforward. Here, as
is more typical in discussions of "default" within the context of civil
litigation, the defendant fails to respond to a complaint that has been
properly filed and served. After the defendant fails to respond within
152. See Sunderland, supra note 131, at 218 (stating that the fundamental problem prior to
trial is to determine what needs to be tried and that cannot be done without examination of the
pleadings).
153. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
154. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1) ("A summons must be served with a copy of the complaint.
The plaintiff is responsible for having the summons and complaint served within the time al-
lowed by Rule 4(m) and must furnish the necessary copies to the person who makes service.").
155. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b)-(c) (providing that a defendant may deny or set out affirmative
defenses to the allegations set out in the pleading); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
156. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(a)(D).
157. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a).
158. See FED. R. Civ. P. 27, 30, 31.
159. See FED. R. Civ. P. 33.
160. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
161. See FED. R. Civ. P. 36.
162. See FED. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
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the twenty-one days required by Rule 12, the plaintiff applies for en-
try of a default against the defendant with the clerk of the court.1 63
In the first hypothetical, the parties create the impression of having
equal interests and investment in the litigation up to the point at
which the defendant fails to appear at the trial. Both parties are ac-
tive in the litigation, and discovery has not been substantially impeded
for either side. The plaintiff is able to obtain documents, 164 witness
testimony,165 medical records, 166 and any other pertinent materials
with which it can formulate a theory of the case and ascertain what
defenses the defendant may have. The plaintiff enters the courthouse
on the day of trial prepared to litigate his case against an active oppo-
nent who is prepared in his defense.
The critical difference between the first and second hypotheticals is
that, in the second, the default occurs at a stage of litigation in which
the plaintiff has been unable to substantiate any of the allegations in
the complaint. In this scenario, the basis for Rule 55 appears obvious.
The drafters wanted a system that motivated parties to "ascertain the
truth" and "attain justice" after "all available data [has been] laid
before the tribunal trying the case in order to enable it to do jus-
tice."' 167 This rule envisions a scenario in which the court is unable to
collect such data. Thus, the only proper course of action is to punish
the party that impedes the court's goal: the dilatory defendant. It is
impossible for the plaintiff to prove his case on the merits as the draft-
ers wished, so a default is a necessary evil. This is the ideal situation
for a trial judge to enter a "generally disfavored" default.168
While defaults "provide a useful remedy when a litigant is con-
fronted with an .obstructionist adversary,"'169 the question is one of de-
termining the point at which a party becomes so obstructionist as to
merit such a "severe sanction.' 170 The previous hypotheticals illus-
trate a stark contrast in the levels of obstruction imposed upon a dili-
gent plaintiff, depending upon the point at which the defendant fails
to actively defend the suit. A defendant that obstructs a plaintiff from
pursuing any discovery efforts by foregoing the filing of any pleading
163. See id.
164. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
165. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30, 31.
166. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
167. Holtzoff, supra note 21, at 1060.
168. See Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1993).
169. Id.
170. Cody v. Mello, 59 F.3d 13, 15 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing default judgments as "the most
severe sanction which the court may apply").
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warrants a "severe sanction.' 1 71 Once again, the drafters of the FRCP
specifically envisioned situations in which a party has failed to comply
with discovery orders and provided useful remedies for such situa-
tions.172 But a defendant that has complied with discovery orders
before missing a trial date has not impeded a plaintiff from developing
his case. In such an instance, the defendant has merely hindered his
own ability to defend the case on the merits.
There is a more direct route the court can pursue to protect the
plaintiff's interests without the sledgehammer effect that a default
would impose on a mildly uncooperative defendant. That alternative
is to allow the plaintiff to present its case in the defendant's ab-
sence.1 73 The advantages of this technique benefit both parties and
the court.
First, the plaintiff is permitted to present the court with the case
that he has diligently prepared. After presenting the evidence upon
which he builds his claim for relief, the plaintiff does not have to de-
feat any defenses that an active defendant would impose during the
course of a standard trial. Also, if the defendant later realizes the
error of his ways and appeals the case, he must overcome a judgment
on the merits that the appellate court cannot overturn without a find-
ing of clear error, 174 as opposed to "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect.' 75 This higher standard will help the plaintiff
maintain his judgment going forward. 176
Second, the defendant receives a benefit, whether deserved or not.
In a trial on the merits, the plaintiff has to prove his case by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. In a typical default judgment proceeding, on
the other hand, findings on liability are deemed true and the only ac-
tion taken by the court is to conduct a hearing to determine the
amount of damages owed to the plaintiff.1 77 Though this advantage
171. Id.
172. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A); see also infra notes 125-42 and accompanying text.
173. See Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp. v. Bio-Energy Systems, Inc., 803 F.2d 1130, 1134
(11th Cir. 1986); see also Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205, 210 (5th Cir. 1949).
174. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6).
175. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
176. See infra notes 192-210 and accompanying text.
177. See FED. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Admittedly, Rule 55(b) explicitly provides that a trial judge
may conduct a hearing to "establish the truth of any allegation by evidence," but it is common
for a judgment to be given to the plaintiff close to or at the amount sued for, and circuit courts
seem to acknowledge that it is uncommon to require a plaintiff to present evidence in a default
judgment proceeding. See Bass, 172 F.2d at 208; see also United States v. DiMucci, 879 F.2d
1488, 1497 (7th Cir. 1989) ("As a general rule, a default judgment establishes, as a matter of law,
that defendants are liable to plaintiff as to each cause of action alleged in the complaint.");
Brockton Savings Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 771 F.2d 5, 13 (1st Cir. 1985) ("[T]here
is no question that, default having been entered, each of [plaintiff's] allegations of fact must be
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may be minimal because of the defendant's inability to proffer a de-
fense, it is an added benefit above the standard acceptance of the alle-
gations that occurs in most default judgment proceedings.
Finally, there is a benefit to the judge who conducts a trial on the
merits, as opposed to entering a default. A primary concern cited by
the federal circuit courts in favor of allowing Rule 55 defaults at the
trial stage is "the orderly and expeditious conduct of litigation."'178 If
a trial judge, however, grants an application for entry of default to a
plaintiff, and the defendant has previously appeared, notice must be
given to the defendant at least seven days before the default judgment
hearing can occur. 179 Further, a period is recommended, if not re-
quired, in jurisdictions that have adopted "civility codes," which re-
quire more notice as an ethical obligation. 180 In this scenario, the trial
judge has a prepared plaintiff and a previously scheduled window of
time to conduct a trial that are essentially wasted because a second
court date is now required. The trial judge should instead proceed
with the plaintiff's case on the scheduled date. A second date may not
be necessary and the trial judge can clear one more case off of the
court's docket. Also, the trial will assuredly be shorter than originally
assumed because only one party will present its case. It is unlikely
that the "orderly and expeditious conduct of litigation"'' can be pre-
served more efficiently.
Although this shift in practice may appear to limit the trial judge's
power, the motivation behind the existing sentiment to allow default is
better served by a trial on the merits. When the improvements to a
judge's docket are accompanied by the previously stated advantages
to both the plaintiff and the defendant, the theoretical result can be
properly characterized as win-win-win.
taken as true and each of its seven claims must be considered established as a matter of law.").
Further, the trial-court would be required to wait at least seven days after serving notice upon
the defaulting defendant before conducting any hearing on the allegations or damages. See infra
notes 179-180 and accompanying text.
178. Ringgold Corp. v. Worrall, 880 F.2d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Brock v. Unique
Racquetball & Health Clubs, Inc., 786 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1986)).
179. See FED. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). This concern is inapplicable to the second hypothetical
above because the notice and hearing provisions of Rule 55 apply only to parties who have made
an appearance. See Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors, 761 F.2d 1527, 1531 (11th Cir. 1985).
This does not have to be a court filing, but some affirmative act must be made by the party in
order for the court to be required to acknowledge its presence. See, e.g., Traveltown, Inc. v.
Gerhardt Inv. Grp., 577 F. Supp. 155, 157 (N.D.N.Y. 1983).
180. See Adam Owen Glist, Enforcing Courtesy: Default Judgments and the Civility Move-
ment, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 757, 768 (2000).
181. Ringgold Corp., 880 F.2d at 1141 (quoting Brock v. Unique Racquetball & Health Clubs,
Inc., 786 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1986).
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IV. IMPACT
This Comment does not argue that a default against the defendant
after the pleading stage is always improper. Rather, it suggests that
certain stages of the litigation process more readily provide for default
opportunities that better address the competing interests of judicial
efficiency and the disposition of cases on the merits.182 This Part ex-
amines the effect of a trial on the merits in the defendant's absence
upon damage awards,183 and then explains the effect it would have
upon the finality of judgments in cases in which a defendant fails to
appear for trial.' 8 4
A. Trials on the Merits will Result in Lower Damage Awards
In a standard default judgment scenario, the well-pleaded allega-
tions in the complaint are taken as true, with no burden on the plain-
tiff to prove them beyond a preponderance of the evidence. 185
Presumably, there will be cases in which this will lead to damage
awards that are higher than what would have been granted had the
plaintiff been required to prove the damages at trial. This is not to say
that the plaintiff must be unethical or dishonest to receive higher dam-
ages. It is not uncommon for a complaint to contain allegations that,
though reasonable and "well-pleaded" under the FRCP,86 would not
survive if evidence were required to support them.18 7 Although not
every trial on the merits would result in a lower damage award than a
182. See Brock v. Unique Racquetball & Health Clubs, Inc., 786 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1986)
(concluding that a trial judge's responsibilities with regard to the orderly and expeditious con-
duct of litigation allow for broad sanctions for non-attendance); see also Park, supra note 119, at
159-60 (stating that judicial preference for "just resolution of disputes on the merits" is the
competing policy with speedy determination of pending litigation).
183. See infra notes 185-191 and accompanying text.
184. See infra notes 192-210 and accompanying text.
185. See Nishimatsu Contr. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)
("The defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of fact, is con-
cluded on those facts by the judgment, and is barred from contesting on appeal the facts thus
established."); see also Nw. Yeast Co. v. Broutin, 133 F.2d 628, 630 (6th Cir. 1943) ("Appellant
being in default for answer, we take the allegations of the petition as true."); Int'l Painters &
Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. R.W. Amrine Drywall Co., 239 F. Supp. 2d 26, 30 (D.D.C.
2002).
186. Cf int'l Painters & Allied Trades, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 30 ("A defaulting defendant is
deemed to admit every well-pleaded allegation in the complaint.").
187. See Sunderland, supra note 131, at 26.
The great weakness of pleading as a means for developing and presenting issues of fact
for trial lay in its total lack of any means for testing the factual basis for the pleader's
allegations and denials. They might rest upon the soundest evidence, or they might rest
upon nothing at all.
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standard default proceeding,188 there are numerous instances in which
this change would limit .the damage award in a manner that better
effectuates justice.18 9
There have been many attempts over the past few decades to limit
damage awards, even those that have been awarded by juries.190
Whether or not areas of the American judicial system actually need to
be "reformed" to prevent injustice, 19' there is merit to the belief that
the system should limit damage awards to those that are actually de-
served and provable beyond a preponderance of the evidence. A sim-
ple way to accomplish this is to prohibit default judgments when the
plaintiff has completed sufficient discovery to offer his case.
B. Trials on the Merits Will Result in an Increase
in the Finality of Judgments
Modern commentators have cited the readiness with which courts
are willing to set aside default judgments as a major problem with the
default judgment system.192 Along with the significant variation be-
tween the courts in applying Rule 60(b) to appeals of default judg-
ments,193 a general liberality in applying the "excusable neglect"
standard has created a system in which appeals are commonly
granted. 194
188. One can think of any number of examples, such as a standard contract claim with an
obvious breach. E.g., Cnty. of Morris v. Fauver, 707 A.2d 958, 972 (N.J. 1998) ("[M]ost contract
actions presume that the parties to a contract know the terms of their agreement and a breach is
generally obvious and detectable with any reasonable diligence.").
189. The obvious example, especially to those in support of tort reform, would be a medical
malpractice suit in which pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and the like are claimed in
the complaint. See, e.g., Yako v. United States, 891 F.2d 738, 746 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming an
award of $1.3 million for "pain, suffering, and loss of the enjoyment of life").
190. See Michael P. Allen, A Survey and Some Commentary on Federal "Tort Reform", 39
AKRON L. REV. 909, 909-10 (2006) (noting that for several decades there have been attempts to
reform the American tort system and though these efforts have been concentrated at the state
level, significant efforts have also been made at the national level).
191. See Tillinghast Study: U.S. Tort Costs Reach a Record $260 Billion, INSURANCE JOURNAL,
Mar. 13, 2006, available at http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2006/03/13/66411.htm.
But see Department of Justice Study Disproves Tort "Reform" Myths, PUBLIC CITIZEN, http://
www.citizen.org/congress/articleredirect.cfm?ID=5671 (last visited Nov. 4, 2012).
192. See generally Park, supra note 119, at 155 (discussing the liberal application of the "ex-
cusable neglect" standard for vacating a default judgment under Rule 60(b) as a major issue in
current appeals of default judgments).
193. See id. at 164-65 (illustrating the divide between the circuits that applied Rule 60(b) in all
situations except those that involved willful or culpable conduct or bad faith, and the circuits that
expressly rejected the use of Rule 60(b) in situations that resulted from carelessness or
negligence).
194. See id. at 166-67 nn.79-80 (listing federal circuit court cases that apply a liberal analysis
of excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) with express consent from the Supreme Court).
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Rule 55(c) explicitly states that Rule 60(b) is the standard by which
a default judgment may be set aside. 195 Rule 60(b)(1) states that a
court can relieve a party from any final judgment, order, or proceed-
ing for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."'1 96 The
Supreme Court, in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick As-
sociates Ltd. Partnership, held that, using the ordinary meaning of the
words, Congress intended to allow trial courts to consider "both sim-
ple, faultless omissions to act and, more commonly, omissions caused
by carelessness."' 97 This minimal standard allows for countless cir-
cumstances that will permit for a default judgment to be set aside.1 98
Instead, if a trial judge were to continue with a trial on the merits in
the defendant's absence, a different appellate standard would apply.
Continuing with the original trial would necessarily include findings of
fact upon which the trial judge could make a determination of both
liability and damages. These findings of fact would be in the record
and permit the appellate court to determine the basis for the trial
court's judgment. When a factual basis exists for a trial judge's deter-
mination, Rule 52 applies on appeal. 99 Any determination of fact
made by a trial judge sitting without a jury that is "amply supported
by the record" is binding upon the appellate court.200 This standard is
very deferential to the trial judge and has even been adhered to in
situations in which the trial court failed to comply with every applica-
ble rule.20 1
The practical implications of the choice between a default and a
trial on the merits involve a stark contrast to the deference given to
the judgment at the trial level. If a trial court were to simply default a
defendant that failed to appear at trial, and hold a hearing on dam-
ages, the time and resources expended on that initial determination
195. FED. R. Civ. P. 55(c) ("The court may set aside an entry of default for good cause, and it
may set aside a default judgment under Rule 60(b).").
196. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
197. Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993). The
court held that this definition aligned with the policies underlying Chapter 11 bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. See id. This definition was explicitly extended to a Rule 4 case, thereby extending it to
all cases appealable under Rule 60(b)(1). See Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193, 195 (1996).
198. See, e.g., Cheney v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 71 F.3d 848, 850 (11th Cir. 1996)
(holding that a failure in communication between lead counsel and associate counsel was care-
less enough to set aside the default judgment).
199. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence,
must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to
the trial court's opportunity to judge the witnesses' credibility.").
200. See Vessella v. United States, 405 F.2d 599, 600 (4th Cir. 1969).
201. See Olson v. Philco-Ford, 531 F.2d 474, 476 (10th Cir. 1976) (stating that as long as the
appellate court was provided with a limited record to determine credibility of the opinion, the
trial court's findings should be left to stand unless "clearly erroneous").
[Vol. 62:159
RULE 55 AT TRIAL
could be rendered irrelevant. An appeal of a default judgment is rela-
tively likely to succeed, in part because it is based upon issues that are
entirely separate from the trial judge's determinations.20 2 Any deter-
mination that the trial judge makes in a default hearing is irrelevant to
the appellate court's review of that decision. The trial judge could
enter a default against the defendant after determining that the defen-
dant failed to appear for a properly scheduled trial, and that same
determination could be set aside due to confusion caused by with-
drawal of counsel,20 3 clerical errors,2°4 or any number of other rea-
sons. 20 5 These concerns may not have been within the purview of the
trial court and have now completely negated the trial judge's previous
determination.
If, however, the trial judge simply completes the previously sched-
uled trial, the judgment is much more likely to stand. If sufficient dis-
covery has been completed, the trial judge has the ability to allow
information, upon which he can base a decision, into the record. It
would be unwise to ignore this mechanism for a sustainable and just
decision by blindly ignoring the viability of the issues of the case. Not
only would such an approach go against the system, which was de-
signed by the framers to allow "all available data [to] be laid before
the tribunal trying the case in order to enable it to do justice," 20 6 but
the judgment appears expected to be set aside on appeal.
A parallel to the idea that a judge's decision should be based upon
all available data is the current approach to appellate review of trial
court findings.20 7 Under Rule 52, "[flindings of fact .. .must not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give
due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the witnesses'
credibility. ' 208 The Supreme Court has held that this "clearly errone-
ous" standard is only violated when "the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed. '20 9 In applying this standard, however, some cir-
cuit courts have found that a trial judge's failure to weigh all relevant
202. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
203. Thorpe v. Thorpe, 364 F.2d 692, 693-94 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
204. See Finch v. Big Chief Drilling Co., 56 F.R.D. 456, 458 (E.D. Tex. 1972).
205. See 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2695
(3d ed. 1998).
206. Holtzoff, supra note 21, at 1060.
207. Id.
208. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6).
209. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
2012]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
evidence prior to making factual findings amounted to "clear
error."
210
Though there are clear procedural differences between an appeal of
a trial court's factual findings and a trial judge's decision whether or
not to default a defendant, the policy concerns are strikingly similar.
The judicial system requires the courts to make the correct determina-
tion to the best of their abilities, and this determination dictates that
in doing so, all relevant and available evidence must be considered.
Thus, there is ample justification to extend this fundamental prefer-
ence for a trial on the merits to the situation at hand. As such, for
interests of both justice and finality of judgments, a trial on the merits
is superior to a default when a plaintiff fails to appear at trial after
dutifully taking part in litigation prior to that point.
V. CONCLUSION
Since 1949, the federal judiciary has tried to determine whether the
phrase "otherwise defend" extends Rule 55 beyond the pleading
stage211 and has been conflicted in its determinations on the issue.212
In particular, the proper course of action for a trial judge when a de-
fendant fails to appear at trial after complying with all prior aspects of
the litigation is one which the courts have not fully developed. Inher-
ent in every opinion on the issue is the choice between the principles
of judicial efficiency and the preference for judgment on the merits.213
Despite these concerns, courts will ignore obvious opportunities to
default defendants who fail to actively participate in discovery; in-
stead, they apply a Rule 55 default at a later instance of misconduct. 214
If judicial efficiency is a proper justification to default a party at trial,
it is certainly also proper,to default a party for discovery violations
210. See Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (stating that because a court
hearing a habeas petition must review all the evidence for its determination, ignoring relevant
evidence is clear error); see also Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[W]e have
reversed factual findings ... where the court failed to weigh all of the relevant evidence before
making its factual findings." (citation omitted)).
211. See supra notes 40-106 and accompanying text.
212. Compare Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that
a failure to appear at trial is just as disruptive as a failure to plead and thus was a failure to
"otherwise defend" under Rule 55), with Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1949) (holding
that Rule 55, on its face, applies only to the pleading stage).
213. Compare Brock v. Unique Racquetball & Health Clubs, Inc., 786 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir.
1986) ("[A] trial judge, responsible for the orderly and expeditious conduct of litigation, must
have broad latitude to impose the sanction of default for non-attendance .... "), with Davis v.
Parkhill-Goodloe Co., 302 F.2d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 1962) ("Where there are no intervening equi-
ties any doubt should, as a general proposition, be resolved in favor of the movant to the end of
securing a trial upon the merits." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
214. See supra notes 125-42 and accompanying text.
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prior to the trial date. Hence, if trial judges were more willing to
wield their default powers under Rule 37, many judicial efficiency
concerns could be addressed without the use of Rule 55 at trial.
If these dueling concerns are the main issues that a trial judge must
address in any default situation, a default at trial is not the best course
of action. Judicial resources are a constant concern for the federal
judiciary, and this concern is not aided by the delay that comes with
defaulting a defendant at trial. Continuing with a trial on the merits is
the option that best promotes efficiency and justice.
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